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  We obtain explicit expressions for the subjective, objective and market 
value of perpetual executive stock options (ESOs) under exogenous 
employment shocks driven by an independent Poisson process. Within this set-
up, we obtain the executive’s optimal exercise policy which allows us to analyze 
the determinants of both, the subjective valuation by executives and the 
objective valuation by firms. The perpetual ESO is compared with the more 
realistic finite maturity ESO finding that the approximation is reasonably good. 
We also use the objective valuation’s results for accounting purposes. Further, 
we analyze the objective valuation distribution when there is uncertainty about 
the employment shock parameter. Finally, the role of ESOs in the design of 
executive’s incentives is also discussed. 
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 31 Introduction
The increasing relevance of executive stock options (ESOs) as a component of corporate compensation
has led the International Accounting Standard Board (IASB) to issue the International Financial Re-
porting Standard 2 (IFRS 2) in February 2004. In March 2004, the Financial Accounting Standard
Board (FASB) has also revised the Financial Accounting Standard 123 (FAS 123R) with a similar pur-
pose, namely, to provide a fair value method for shared based compensation arrangement.1 Computing
the fair value of one ESO is not straightforward, this is so because ESOs are American call options
modiﬁed to create the required incentives for aligning executive’s goals with shareholders’ interests.
Thus, ESOs cannot be sold or transferred, although partial hedge is possible by trading correlated
assets. In addition, they can only be exercised after ending the vesting period. Consequently, standard
methods for valuing American options are not directly applicable and a growing literature has been
searching for a solution to the issue of ESO valuation. As in Hull and White (2004), Leung and Sircar
(2009) and FASB statement 123R, we also assume that the possible dilution eﬀect is anticipated by the
the market and already reﬂected in the stock price immediately after the ESO grant.
As any American call option, the value of an ESO depends on its payoﬀ and this is clearly
determined by the holder’s exercise policy. In this regard, the literature has distinguished among three
possible values for ESOs. First, there is a subjective ESO value given by what one ESO is worth to
an executive. This value is quite diﬀerent from the market price obtained from standard risk neutral
valuation methods, as the Black-Scholes price for European options. This diﬀerence is clearly illustrated
by a common ﬁnding in the empirical literature on the subject. As illustrated by the works of Huddart
and Lang (1996) and Bettis et al. (2005), ESOs are typically exercised well before maturity and mostly
right after the end of the vesting period. In general, this behavior is inconsistent with the exercise
policy that a well diversiﬁed investor facing an unrestricted environment would follow, giving rise to
the ESO market price. Finally, motivated by the recent accounting standards, the literature has also
introduced the objective value or the shareholders’ cost when issuing the option. Although companies
do not face the same hedging restrictions than their executives do, the ESO cost is not equal to its
1We will only concentrate on the FAS 123R since both standards establish rather the same purpose concerning the
fair value.
4market price because of the executive’s exercise policy.
Thus, either the subjective or the objective value turns out to be dependent on the precise way in
which the exercise policy is incorporated. In this regard, we can distinguish two broad lines of analysis.
In the ﬁrst line, the exercise policy is obtained from structural models in which executives maximize
their expected utility subject to a given set of constraints. Lambert et al. (1991) is an early example.
They establish the subjective ESO value as its certainty-equivalence. Subsequently, Huddart (1994)
and Kulatilaka and Marcus (1994) use this framework to provide an estimate of this subjective value
determining the executive’s exercise rule on a binomial tree. However, they restrict the executive to
hold her wealth only in the risk free asset. Hall and Murphy (2002) and Cai and Vijh (2005) allow
a more general setting in which the executive’s wealth can also be held in restricted stocks or some
market portfolio, respectively. Tian (2004) also uses this approach to study the incentive eﬀects of
European-style ESOs. All of them are static analyses in which the executive maximizes the expected
utility of terminal wealth. Kahl et al. (2003) and Ingersoll (2006) use a dynamic approach such that
the executive takes decisions about his optimal consumption and portfolio composition.
In a second line of reduced form models, the exercise policy is described either by some exogenous
random event or by some exogenous parameter (or both) that forces the early option exercise and hence,
the option expected life. An early example might be Jennergren and N¨ aslund (1993), who introduce
an exogenous and independent Poisson process whose ﬁrst arrival forces the early exercise of (vested)
options. Carpenter (1998) shows that this type of models performs as well as structural ones and Carr
and Linetsky (2000) advocate their use because of their simplicity. Hull and White (2004) illustrate
the inclusion of a virtual strike price that triggers early exercise and that can be calibrated so as to
match the option expected life.
Our contribution can be placed along the ﬁrst class of models. We use a simpliﬁed version of
Ingersoll’s (2006) model in which the executive allocates her wealth across the market portfolio and
risk free bonds, but the risk factors are reduced to just the market risk. Therefore, the executive is
constrained to hold more of the company stock than its corresponding share in the market portfolio.2
As a result, there are two sources of risk, one coming from the non diversiﬁable systematic risk factor,
underlying the market portfolio, and the other coming from the idiosyncratic component not correlated
with market risk. In a well diversiﬁed portfolio, the only source of risk would come exclusively from the
2See the introduction to Ingersoll’s (2006) article for a list of possible reasons of such undiversiﬁed holdings.
5market portfolio and any other idiosyncratic component would have vanished. From the maximization
of a lifetime utility function, an stochastic discount factor (SDF) is found which, by including those two
sources of risk, can be used for pricing ESOs. We extend this model by including a job termination risk
along the lines of Jennergren and N¨ aslund (1993). The inclusion of this additional source of risk leads
to a valuation model similar to that of Sircar and Xiong (2007). There is nonetheless a basic diﬀerence,
they solve their model under the risk neutral measure which does not consider the executive’s exercise
policy. Instead, we use the real measure and obtain a closed form solution for the executive’s exercise
policy. Under this approach it is possible to provide a closed form expression for both, the subjective
and the objective values. The case analyzed by Sircar and Xiong (2007) is only a solution for the ESO
market value, which can be obtained in our approach by simply assuming a risk neutral agent (or a
well diversiﬁed agent).
The merit of this approach lies on its ability to become a reasonable approximation for real
situations based on ﬁnite maturity ESOs, which are computationally more demanding. We show the
bias size for this approximation to be fairly small. We also discuss the impact on the cost of ESOs
when the ﬁrm is uncertain about how likely the executive will ﬁnish the employment relationships. To
this end, the ﬁrm is endowed with a prior distribution for the job termination risk. Finally, we study
the executive’s incentives by analyzing the subjective ESO delta and vega.
Section 2 presents the theoretical results for the subjective valuation of ESOs. Section 3 discusses
how the subjective valuation is aﬀected by changes in the relevant parameters and shows the size of
the bias incurred by the use of the perpetual ESO against the ﬁnite maturity case. Section 4 includes
the theoretical results about the objective ESO valuation or ﬁrm cost, the corresponding goodness
of ﬁt in the approximation to the ﬁnite maturity case is also discussed and the implications for the
accounting standards. This section concludes with a discussion of the impact that uncertainty on
the job termination risk has on the cost of ESO. In Section 5, we show how ESO aﬀects executive’s
performance through his subjective ’greeks’. Section 6 concludes.
2 Subjective ESO valuation
Our benchmark model will be a perpetual ESO with a stochastic live arising from exogenousemployment
shocks which forces the termination of the employment relationship, as in the model of Jennergren and
6N¨ aslund (1993). These shocks can arise from either the executive’s side, due to voluntary resignation, or
from the ﬁrm’s side, due to the executive dismissal. In any case, the executive is forced to exercise the
option if the event occurs after the vesting period, or to forfeit it, if the vesting period has not ended yet.
The time at which the employment relationship is terminated is simply modeled as the ﬁrst event of a
Poisson process with hazard rate of λ per unit time. This Poisson process is assumed to be independent
of any other stochastic process underlying our menu of assets. The hazard rate leads to jumps in the
ESO price, but not in the underlying stock price, as in Jennergren and N¨ aslund (1993). We assume
that the job termination risk is not priced, so that it can be diversiﬁed away. This assumption is very
common in the literature. See, for instance, Jennergren and N¨ aslund (1993), Carpenter (1998), Carr
and Linetsky (2000), Hull and White (2004), Sircar and Xiong (2007) and Leung and Sircar (2009).
Those employment shocks force exogenous exercise of ESOs. Endogenous exercise results from
the optimizing behavior of the executive which typically is assumed to solve a constrained maximization
problem. We shall consider the same menu of assets as in Ingersoll (2006), a risk-free bond, the market
portfolio and the company stock. The equations describing the dynamics of the company stock and














dt + σMdZM ,
where µS and µM denote the growth rate of the stock and the market portfolio respectively, while
qS and qM stand for the corresponding continuous dividend yields. The ﬁrm’s stock and the market
portfolio are assumed to be imperfectly correlated. Formally, the Wiener processes satisfy the following
relationship:
σSdZS = βσMdZM + σIdZI , (1)
where the parameter β is the conventional market beta, and dZM and dZI are independent standard








= (µS − qS)dt + βσMdZM + σIdZI .
As Ingersoll (2006), we assume that the executive is inﬁnitely lived and maximizes an expected
7lifetime utility of the constant relative risk aversion class. To capture the degree of undiversiﬁcation,
we deﬁne the parameter θ as the excess of company’s stock holding over the optimal level already

















denotes the conditional expectation and it is subject to the following dynamic budget
constraint:
dW = {[r + ω(µM − r) + θ(µS − r)]W − C}dt + ωσMWdZM + θσSWdZS , (3)
with initial condition W(0) = W0. For simplicity, no wage income is assumed. Assuming that CAPM




, and using the orthogonal decomposition described in equation (1), we















σMWdZM + θσIWdZI . (4)
Given the above conditions, we can obtain the SDF in the following lemma.









dZM − γθσIdZI (5)
where ˆ r = r − γθ2σ2
I.
This proof is straightforward by following Ingersoll (2006). Notice that, when the executive is either
risk neutral, γ = 0, or has a well diversiﬁed portfolio, θ = 0, the SDF does not include any term
reﬂecting the (diversiﬁable) idiosyncratic risk of the stock. Hence, the resulting value coincides with
the risk neutral price for marketable options.
3Let θ denote the minimum amount of the company stock that the executive is constrained to hold. If ξ⋆ denotes
the optimal share of the company stock in the market portfolio and ω⋆ the optimal share of the market portfolio in the
executive’s total portfolio, then θ would satisfy the following condition θ = θ − ω⋆ξ⋆ ≥ 0.
82.1 Pricing without vesting period
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λdt . (6)
Given equation (6), we get the following result:
Lemma 2 Under the no arbitrage condition in equation (6) and assuming that CAPM holds, we get



















= 0 , (7)
where ˆ r = r − γθ2σ2









denotes the payoﬀ of the ESO holder if there








1{S>K}, where 1{A} is the indicator function such
that 1{A} = 1 if A is true and 1{A} = 0, otherwise.
Proof.- See Appendix A.
Equation (7) is the ODE deﬁning the executive’s value of the ESO in the continuation or waiting
region. The structure of the problem implies that there is a threshold price, S∗, such that the optimal
policy is waiting while S < S∗ and exercising as soon as S ≥ S∗. Hence, at the boundary with the








where the threshold price S∗ is determined endogenously as part of the complete solution. Considering
equations (7), (8) and (9), we obtain the following proposition:
Proposition 3 Assume that there is no vesting period and the ESO is a perpetual American call option,
then the solution to the ODE deﬁned in (7) subject to the following boundary conditions, V (0) = 0 and







      
      
ˆ A1K1−ˆ α1S ˆ α1 if S ≤ K
ˆ B1K1−ˆ α1S ˆ α1 + ˆ B2K1−ˆ α2S ˆ α2 + λ
 
S
λ + ˆ qS
−
K
λ + ˆ r
 
if K < S ≤ ˆ S∗
S − K if S > ˆ S∗
(10)
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and the
values of the constants ˆ A1, ˆ B1 and ˆ B2 are deﬁned in Appendix B by equations (27), (26) and (22)
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= −
 
1 − ˆ α2
 






Proof.- See Appendix B.
V (S) is homogeneous of degree one in both S and K. The ﬁrst two rows of equation (10) show
the subjective ESO value when the price is below the optimal subjective threshold. Both belong to a
situation in which the executive is better-oﬀ waiting rather than exercising the option. Consider the
following intuitive explanation of these gains for the second waiting region. Its ﬁrst component comes
from the possible increase in the future price of the underlying stock. The second one concerns the
possibility of exercising the ESO if an employment shock occurs at any future time with a probability
of λ. Hence, the term λ(S/(λ + ˆ qS) − K/(λ + ˆ r)) denotes the expected ESO present value when it
is in-the-money.4 Of course, in the ﬁrst waiting region this term does not appear since the option is
out-of-the-money.
Some remarks about equation (11) are in order. By contrast with the paper of Sircar and Xiong
(2007), we have found a closed form expression for the executive’s exercise policy which is also valid for
non-risk neutral executives. The exercise policy is homogeneous of degree one in K, that is, any change
in the strike price implies a change in the same proportion in the threshold price. Finally, although it
is not easy to ﬁnd general comparative static results, all numerical simulations have provided results










where the time for the ﬁrst employment shock follows an exponential distribution with mean 1/λ.
10that conform with intuition. For instance, a higher value of the employment shock probability tends
to reduce the threshold price.
Figure 1 shows the typical shape of V (S) derived in Proposition 3. This ﬁgure displays several
values for the stock excess holdings. Note that the situation of θ = 0 is equivalent to the ESO risk
neutral valuation. This value acts as an upper boundary for other situations in which the executive is
less diversiﬁed.
2.2 Pricing with vesting period
In this subsection, we extend the results of Proposition 3 to the case of a positive vesting period, ν.
The subjective ESO value at the granting date, t = 0, is obtained in the following proposition.
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where µ = lnS0 − (ˆ r − ˆ qS − σ2






represents the cumulative standard normal
distribution.
Proof.- See Appendix C.
113 Discussion
In this section, we begin studying the impact on the ESO valuation due to changes in several parameters
of interest. These results can be found in the subsection of sensitivity analysis. We turn next to
examine the robustness of our perpetual ESO valuation by comparing with American-style ESOs with
ﬁnite maturities.
For all situations, we assume the risk free interest rate r = 6%, the continuous dividend yield
qS = 1.5% and the market volatility σM = 20%. All these parameter values are taken on a yearly basis.
We assume ESOs are granted at the money. The strike price, K, and the stock price at the granting
date, S0, are equal to $30.
3.1 Sensitivity analysis
We illustrate the eﬀect of varying each of the following parameters: (i) the market beta, β, which can
be either 0 or 1; (ii) the total yearly volatility of the stock return, σS, which can be 30%, 40% or
60%; (iii) the vesting period, ν, which can be either 0 or 3 years; (iv) the employment shock captured
through the yearly Poisson intensity parameter, λ, with values of either 10% or 20%; (v) the excess
stock holding, θ, ranging from 0% to 40%; and ﬁnally, (vi) the risk aversion parameter, γ, with value of
2 or 4. The results of this analysis are displayed in Table 1. This table is divided in four panels labelled
from A to D according to diﬀerent values of λ and ν. Namely, Panel A (λ = 10%, ν = 0), Panel B
(λ = 10%, ν = 3), Panel C (λ = 20%, ν = 0) and Panel D (λ = 20%, ν = 3). Next, we comment on
several features of interest.
First, the ESO market price, V RN, is obtained under the restriction of θ = 0%. It is shown
that V RN increases with the total volatility of the stock return. This feature is independent of the risk
decomposition into common risk or beta and speciﬁc or idiosyncratic risk, σI. The reason is that a well
diversiﬁed agent does not worry about the size of σI. Note that, as expected, V RN acts as an upper
boundary for V SUB.
Second, the higher the value of β the higher V SUB. This eﬀect has already been addressed by
Tian (2004). A value of β = 0 suggests that the market portfolio is useless for hedging the risk of large
holdings of the company stock. Observe that under β = 0, it holds that σS = σI. Thus, for any level of
12both the excess stock holding and risk aversion, an increase in the size of beta such that σS is keeping
constant (i.e, a displacement across any row of Table 1), implies a decrease in the speciﬁc risk which
improves the executive’s utility.
Third, the higher the risk aversion or the excess stock holding, the lower V SUB. Fourth, the
higher the employment shock intensity the lower V SUB. Compare panels A and C when there is no
vesting period, while panels B and D for the positive one. Fifth, the higher the vesting period the lower
V SUB. Compare panels A and B for λ = 10%, or panels C and D for λ = 20%.
Last but not least, increases in σS have ambiguous eﬀects on V SUB. This is due to the fact
that, as β is kept constant, changes in σ2
I are one-to-one changes in σ2
S. The conventional analysis of
American call options shows that a higher variance tends to increase V SUB. If this increase is due to a
higher idiosyncratic volatility, the adjusted interest rate falls and the adjusted dividend yield increases
and, pursuing further the analogy with American calls options, these changes tend to decrease V SUB.
In Table 1 we see that V SUB tends to fall as σI increases when either γ or θ are large. For instance,
V SUB increases with σI in the column of Panel A for the values of β = 1, γ = 2 and θ = 10%. By
contrast, V SUB decreases in the column of Panel A for the values of β = 1, γ = 2 and θ = 30%. There
also some transitional cases in which V SUB exhibits an U-shaped behavior or its inverse. For instance,
the column of Panel A for the values of β = 1, γ = 2 and θ = 20% illustrates the U-shaped case, and
the column of Panel B for the values of β = 0, γ = 2 and θ = 20%, the inverted U-shaped case.
Notice, however, that a higher value of λ tends to reverse the former relationship, making V SUB
increasing in σI. However, this eﬀect only appears for short vesting periods, compare the values in Panel
A with those in Panel C.5 Therefore, for the typical length of vesting periods observed in practice, this
eﬀect does not seem to modify substantially the behavior of V SUB with respect to changes in σI.
3.2 Perpetual versus ﬁnite maturities
It becomes interesting to analyze if ESOs having ﬁnite maturities are adequately approximated by
perpetual ones. We calculate ESO prices with ﬁnite maturities using the least-squares Monte Carlo
algorithm (LSMC henceforth) of Longstaﬀ and Schwartz (2001). We simulate the risk neutral price
process but replacing r and qS respectively by ˆ r and ˆ qS, as deﬁned in Lemma 2.
5In additional results, not reported here, for a vesting period of one year, an increase in λ from 10% to 20% enlarges
the set of cases for which V SUB increases when σI increases.
13The LSMC uses a backward induction procedure that works as follows. At maturity, the ESO
is exercised if it is in-the-money, then the subjective value of the ESO is V SUB
T = (ST − K)+.6 One
period before, at T −δt where δt is the length of one time step, on one hand there is a probability equal
to 1−eλδt to abandon the ﬁrm and the payoﬀ of the ESO would be (ST−δt −K)+. On the other hand,
with probability eλδt the executive remains in the ﬁrm and thus, he must decide either to hold or to






in this case the ESO value will be ST−δt − K. Otherwise, the payoﬀ will be the discounted expected
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is the discounted expectation of the ESO value.7 The conditional expected
ESO value is computed by least-squares such that for those paths in-the-money, the one period ahead
ESO value is regressed over some basis functions of the current stock price. We work backwards until
the vesting or grant date with this scheme. We use 20,000 paths simulated with monthly frequency8
and we take the average of 50 previous estimations using 25 diﬀerent seeds plus the corresponding 25
antithetics.
Figure 2 exhibits alternative subjective ESO values without vesting period for diﬀerent values
of β and λ from Table 1. The values of the risk aversion and the total volatility are, respectively,
γ = 2 and σS = 30%. The remaining parameters are the same as in Table 1. The selected time to
maturities, T, go from 5 years until 25 years, denoted as V SUB
T . It is observed that ESO prices do not
change from about 15 years until the end and considering alternative values of θ, see the graphics on
the left. The graphics of relative biases, (V SUB − V SUB
T )/V SUB
T , where V SUB are the perpetual ESO
values from Table 1 displayed on the right lead to a decreasing pattern as T increases. Indeed, this
positive bias tends to be lower than 10% for the benchmark American-style ESO with a maturity of ten
years. In short, the benchmark ESO value is well approximated through the perpetual one.9 For the
shortest maturity, T = 5, the largest bias is around 25% for λ = 10%, while it decreases signiﬁcantly to
6Note that (ST − K)+ is the same as (ST − K)1{ST >K}.
7Hull and White (2004) and Ammann and Seiz (2004) also introduce in the same way the exit rate for the backwards
induction in their binomial tree models.
8Stentoft (2004) obtains that the LSMC method with 10 exercise points per year produce very accurate prices compared
with the ones obtained using a binomial model with 50,000 time steps. He argues that more accurate prices are obtained
when increasing the simulated paths or the number of basis functions used as regressors.
9It is available upon request, though not reported here, a table similar to Table 1 for the case of an ESO with T = 10
years containing the ESO values underlying the four graphics on the left-hand side of Figure 2.
14approximately 10% for λ = 20%. Therefore, the larger the probability of employment shock, the better
the approximation through the perpetual ESO.
4 ESO cost for ﬁrms
ESOs are extensively used as a payment scheme that may help ﬁrms in retaining and motivating its
executives. As a result, an ever increasing part of the executive’s compensation packages have taken the
form of ESOs and this has motivated a discussion about the precise way in which this cost should be
evaluated. There is not yet a consensus on this issue because of the lack of a general agreement about
what should be the right model. Despite of this, there is a general agreement of the role played by the
subjective value in the computation of the ESO cost for ﬁrms. This cost depends on the executive’s
exercise policy which is a function of his subjective ESO valuation. Since the ﬁrm is not restricted
to hedge the risk associated with the stock options, the objective valuation will be a straightforward
modiﬁcation of the risk neutral one. That is, the ESO cost for the ﬁrm is the amount that would receive
if the ESO were sold to a well diversiﬁed investor with the risk-averseexecutive’s exercise policy, to which
we should also add, facing exogenous employment shocks that may end the employment relationship.
4.1 Objective ESO valuation
We shall denote by V OBJ the objective ESO value. It is immediate that the former deﬁnition implies
that V OBJ is the solution to the ODE described in equation (7) for the case of risk neutral agents
(or, equivalently, well diversiﬁed agents). Recall that this case follows from setting the parameter γ, or
either the parameter θ, to zero. In this case the adjusted risk free rate, ˆ r, and the adjusted dividend





















15where the boundary conditions are now given by
V (0) = 0 (15)
V (ˆ S
∗) = ˆ S
∗ − K, (16)
such that ˆ S∗ is the executive’s threshold price obtained in Proposition 3.10
We start getting the explicit expression for V OBJ when there is no vesting. This turns out to be
a slight modiﬁcation of Proposition 3. The precise result is stated in the following corollary.
Corollary 5 Assuming that there is no vesting period and the ESO is a perpetual American call option,
the objective ESO value is given by the solution to the ODE deﬁned in equation (14) subject to the







      
      
˜ A1K1−α1Sα1 if S ≤ K








if K < S ≤ ˆ S∗
S − K if S > ˆ S∗
(17)
where ˆ S∗ is the executive’s threshold price obtained in Proposition 3, α1 and α2 are the roots correspond-
ing to the risk neutral case and the values of ˜ A1, ˜ B1 and ˜ B2 are deﬁned in Appendix D by equations
(34), (33) and (32), respectively.
Proof.- See Appendix D.11
This result can also be extended to the case of a positive vesting period. Speciﬁcally, by plugging
both the risk neutral SDF and the executive’s threshold price, ˆ S∗, into Proposition 4 we get the next
corollary.
10Notice that V OBJ can also be obtained as the solution to a perpetual up-and-in barrier option with ˆ S∗ as the upper
barrier. See Ingersoll (2006) for the ﬁnite maturity case.
11As in the subjective valuation case, V (S) is linearly homogeneous in S and K.




































where the constants ˜ A1, ˜ B1 and ˜ B2 are those obtained in Corollary 5.
Proof.- The above equation follows easily from equation (13) of Proposition 4 by setting γ = 0, or θ = 0,
and taking ˆ S∗ in Proposition 3 as the threshold price.
As in Section 3.1 we can show, with the help of the former results, the eﬀects on V OBJ of changes
in several parameters of interest. Figure 3 summarizes the main ﬁndings concerning the impact on
V OBJ of diﬀerent values for γ, θ and β. We take the values of σS = 30%, σM = 20%, ν = 3 and
λ = 20% as our benchmark values. The straight line at the top of the ﬁgure represents V RN = 6.240
which corresponds to the second row of Panel D in Table 1. The picture of the left hand side shows
that V OBJ decreases with the degree of risk aversion, γ, and with the undiversiﬁcation parameter, θ.
Conversely, a higher value of β implies, for given total volatility of the company stock and the market
portfolio, a lower idiosyncratic volatility and hence, a higher value of V OBJ. The intuition is that all
those changes reduce the threshold price that triggers the ESO exercise. The picture on the right hand
side displays the ratio between the subjective and the objective value. We can see that, although the
former changes aﬀect V SUB and V OBJ in the same way, the ESO ratio decreases signiﬁcantly with the
degree of risk aversion, γ, the undiversiﬁcation parameter, θ and the size of the idiosyncratic risk, σI
(displayed in the ﬁgure as a lower value for β). This is in line with the results of Tian (2004), Ingersoll
(2006) and Chung, Hu and Fu (2008) for the case of European ESOs.
This fall in the ratio is explained by the fact that, although all these changes aﬀect both, the
impact on V OBJ is only through a change in the threshold whereas the impact on V SUB also includes
the changes in ˆ r and ˆ qS, which are absent in the former because it is computed under the risk-neutral
measure (see either Corollary 5 or 6).
Finally, we have also explored the eﬀect of diﬀerent values of the intensity rate. As expected,
V OBJ decreases with higher values of λ and this eﬀect turns out to be larger, the larger the ESO
17vesting period. The ratio V SUB/V OBJ moves up only slightly with higher values of λ and they are not
reported here to save space (but see Table 2 for an illustration of the impact on V OBJ of higher values
of λ).
4.2 Perpetual versus ﬁnite maturity
In this section, we perform the same exercise made in subsection 3.2 and compare the objective perpetual
ESO valuation, V OBJ, with that corresponding to the ﬁnite maturity case, V OBJ
T . We consider a
maturity of ten years, which is frequently used in practice. Additionally, in subsection 3.2, the subjective
perpetual ESO value turns out to perform quite well for this maturity. Thus, it seems natural to use
this maturity to check how well our valuation method approximates the ﬁnite maturity case. This
comparison is exhibited in Table 2. Both perpetual and ﬁnite maturity ESOs are displayed on the left
and right hand-sides respectively for alternative parameter values of λ, β, γ and θ and diﬀerent vesting
periods (one, three and ﬁve years in panels A to C respectively). In this table, we have only considered
the case of σS = 40%. Other values also yield similar results.
Inspection of Table 2 shows that the diﬀerence between both ESO values is not large and decreases







T , go from about 10% to 0% when θ increases for the case of λ = 10% and γ = 2. This
bias can be negative with respect to the former situation for large values of γ, though the size is nearly
the same as above. The case of λ = 20% and γ = 4 also exhibits positive relative biases ranging from
5% to 0% as θ increases. Again, this bias becomes negative in some situations when θ is large. In short,
we can conclude that the perpetual valuation is a good approximation due to the small bias size and
its lower computational intensity.
4.3 Accounting implications
As a result of the increasing relevance of ESOs in the managers compensation packages and the need
to converge with other international standards, the FASB has revised its statement No 123. The new
FAS 123R requires ﬁrms to disclose the method used for estimating the grant-date fair value of their
ESO compensation packages. Among the valuation techniques that the FAS 123R consider acceptable
are both lattice and closed form models, such as the binomial model and the Black-Scholes-Merton
18formula, respectively. Since ESOs are typically exercised before maturity, the FAS 123R (paragraph
A26) explicitly requires that this fair value be based on its expected term, or expected life, rather than
its maturity term. Furthermore, this expected life must be disclosed by ﬁrms as part of the shareholders’
available information (FAS 123R, paragraph A240). In general, this expected life must be estimated.
Kulatilaka and Marcus (1994), among others, have warned against the use of historical data with the
purpose of estimating the option expected term. This is so because the ESO expected life is linked to
the stock market performance during the relevant period and this might lead to poor predictions. As
an example of an acceptable method for estimating this parameter, the FAS 123R suggests using the
estimated ESO fair value, as obtained from a lattice model, as an input of a closed form model, such as
an augmented Black-Scholes-Merton model, from which the implied expected term can be calculated.
Now, we illustrate the usefulness of the perpetual option approximation to the real ﬁnite maturity
option to estimate the ESO expected term. Speciﬁcally, we take the expected life of the objective ﬁnite
maturity ESO which is implicit in the corresponding value of Table 2, and compare it with the implied
expected life that one would obtain by using the objective perpetual ESO price as the value of the FAS











where BS(L) denotes the Black-Scholes (1973) formula with a time to maturity equal to L and a vesting
period of length ν.
Figure 4 displays the results of this comparison through four pictures for two diﬀerent values of
the risk of the employment shock, λ = 10% and λ = 20%, and two values of the degree of risk aversion,
γ = 2 and γ = 4. In all cases, the objective ﬁnite ESO has a term to maturity of ten years. The
remaining parameters are r = 6%, qS = 1.5%, β = 1 and σS = 40% which are used for the evaluation of
both, the objective perpetual and ﬁnite ESO. As it can be seen, the objective perpetual approximation
is good whenever either the risk of the employment shock or the degree of relative risk aversion is high,
or whenever the degree of portfolio diversiﬁcation is low.
194.4 Uncertainty in employment shocks
We study the eﬀects of uncertainty in the likelihood of an employment shock, λ, that is one of the main
parameters in this work. We implement a simple exercise just to motivate this situation. Notice that
the employment relationship may terminate by the side of either the ﬁrm or the executive because of
some exogenous event, for instance, the executive ﬁnds out a better available job. Each part is more
uncertain about the likelihood the other part attaches to this event. Assume that this uncertainty arises
only from the executive’s side. Further, we also assume the ﬁrm’s manager ignores the precise value
of λ, although he has some a priori probability distribution for it. Of course, this will also generate a
probability distribution for the objective value.
For simplicity, we assume a Triangular distribution12 for the values of λ. We consider three prior
distributions for λ, that might be representative of the executive’s outside opportunities. For instance,
in a highly concentrated industry (few ﬁrms), the executive’s employment alternatives would tend to be
scarce, so that the probability of leaving his actual job would be lower than in less concentrated indus-
tries. These prior distributions are classiﬁed according to the skewness behavior capturing alternative
industry concentration levels. An asymmetric distribution with positive (negative) skewness repre-
sents a higher probability mass for small (large) values of λ because the industry is highly (scarcely)
concentrated. And ﬁnally, we also consider a symmetric distribution for an intermediate situation.
For each assumed distribution of λ a total of 10,000 values have been simulated. For the cases
of positive, zero and negative skewness, the values of λ going from the ﬁrst to the third quartiles are,
respectively, [7.5%, 21%], [14.1%, 25.6%] and [18.6%, 32.2%].
Figure 5, containing four pictures denoted from I to IV, displays the box-plots for the objective
values, V OBJ, implied by the above three distributions under several combinations of values for the
diversiﬁcation restriction, θ, and the total volatility, σS. The pairs represented in ﬁgures I to IV are
respectively: {σS = 30%,θ = 10%}, {σS = 30%,θ = 40%}, {σS = 60%,θ = 10%} and {σS = 60%,θ =
40%}. We select a value for β of one and a level of relative risk-aversion of four. Clearly, the implied
distributions of V OBJ coming from the distributions of λ with positive skewness (boxplots labeled as
A) exhibit a higher median value than those distributions of λ with negative skewness (boxplots C).
This is a clear eﬀect of the negative correlation between the size of λ and V OBJ. For instance, these
12See chapter 40 in Evans et al. (2000).
20diﬀerences go from a median value of 8 (boxplot A) to 5 (boxplot C) in picture I. Note also that a
higher volatility leads to a higher median for the objective value. This value is higher the lower is the
restriction on the portfolio diversiﬁcation.
5 Incentive eﬀects
The literature has paid great attention to the optimal design of the executive compensation package
as a way of aﬀecting their incentives. In general, these compensation packages consist of a ﬁxed cash
component, a certain amount of restricted stock and ESOs. Typically, the role of ESOs on executives’
incentives has been approached by examining the sign and size of the ESO greeks. See, for instance,
Ingersoll (2006), Tian (2004) and Chang et al. (2008) among others. Of course, it is understood that
the relevant ESO greeks are those coming from the subjective valuation, those related with executive’s
perception of incentives. In this regard, there are two ways in which ESOs may aﬀect executives’
incentives. First, as part of an agency problem, they align executives and shareholders interests in
raising stock price. The perceived reward from acting this way is measured by the subjective delta
greek, that is, the partial derivative of V SUB with respect to the initial price S0. And second, when a
new investment project is taken, the distribution of ﬁrm’s total risk between the systematic component
and the speciﬁc one will generally change. Given that they aﬀect V SUB very diﬀerently, there might be
a moral hazard problem because of executives’ risk taking behavior. However, the results of subsection
3.1 show that executives have strong incentives to reduce the ﬁrm’s speciﬁc component and to increase
the systematic component of total volatility. Although both results might seem interesting from the
shareholders’ point of view, they are not quite so. For the ﬁrst implication, notice that shareholders do
not face any restrictions to diversify their portfolios. The second one conﬁrms the well known result in
the literature that ESOs generate incentives to increase the systematic component of total risk since it
raises the ﬁrm’s expected return. See for instance, Tian (2004).13
Despite all this, there are at least two reasons to use option greeks in the discussion of how ESOs
aﬀect executives’ incentives. In the ﬁrst place, there is a gap between subjective and objective ESO
valuation and, hence, there is a distinction between the incentives perceived by executives and the cost
13In all numerical simulations performed, we have found that the subjective vega for ﬁrm’s speciﬁc risk is strongly
negative when total risk is held constant, and that the subjective vega for systematic risk is positive. Although these
results are obtained for perpetual American ESOs, they have not been reported in the main text, since they are analogous
to those obtained for the ﬁnite European ESOs which are typically considered in the literature.
21to the ﬁrm of providing those incentives. In particular, Chang et al. (2008) have considered the ratio
between the subjective and the objective greek for ﬁnite European ESOs as a measure of the size of
the perceived incentives per unit cost of the ﬁrm. Since our perpetual American ESOs approximates
reasonably the ﬁnite case as shown in subsection 3.2, we extend their analysis to the case of perpetual
American ESOs. Secondly, it turns out that the ratio between subjective and objective greeks might be
of help in the design of the composition of the executive compensation package, provided the parameters
are conveniently interpreted. We consider next each issue in turn.
Let us consider ﬁrst the incentives to raise shareholders wealth as measured by the subjective
delta, ∆SUB. The ﬁrm’s cost of providing these incentives are measured by the objective delta, ∆OBJ.
The ratio ∆SUB/∆OBJ is then the reward perceived by the executive per unit cost of the ﬁrm. A ratio
below one suggests that the executive’s incentives are lower than those intended by the ﬁrm. As Chang
et al. (2008) have observed a ratio of 0.5, it means that the executive only perceives half of the incentive
eﬀects intended by shareholders. Hence, to provide the same level of incentives, he must be oﬀered at
least twice as many ESOs incurring in a higher cost.14 We show that ∆SUB/∆OBJ is typically below
one when plotted as a function of S0. With regard to the impact of unemployment shocks, a higher
value of λ reduces somewhat the size of this ratio.15
This is depicted in picture I of Figure 6. The ratio ∆SUB/∆OBJ has been computed numerically
by evaluating both partial derivatives using S0 = K as a midpoint, e.g. for at-the-money ESOs. It
turns out that this ratio is monotonically decreasing with θ and below one, except for the case θ = 0
where subjective and objective valuations coincide. This result is not modiﬁed by the consideration of
diﬀerent values of λ. Hence, the maximum perceived incentives to increase ﬁrm’s market value per unit
cost are achieved when the executive does not hold any restricted stock, for at-the-money ESOs.
The former analysis can also be extended to examine executive’s incentives for investments
in risky projects. This is measured by the subjective systematic risk vega, denoted by ΛSUB
β , that
shows the change in V SUB resulting from a unit change in market beta. The ﬁrm’s cost of providing
those incentives is measured analogously by ΛOBJ
β . As before, the ratio ΛSUB
β /ΛOBJ
β , is represented in
picture II of Figure 6 against θ for the case of at-the-money ESOs. The corresponding numerical partial
derivatives have been evaluated using β = 1 as the midpoint. Now, the shape of the curve suggests the
14With decreasing marginal beneﬁts, the amount of ESOs oﬀered to executives should be more than twice the initial
level.
15These results are available upon request.
22existence of a maximum value of the ratio for a certain value of θ denoted as θ∗. Furthermore, this
maximum value turns out to be greater than one.
This issue has been further explored in Figure 7, in which we plot ΛSUB
β /ΛOBJ
β as a function
of θ for several values of the idiosyncratic volatility and of the employment shock likelihood. As it is
shown, the higher the idiosyncratic component, σI, the lower the required amount of restricted stock,
θ∗. A higher value of the likelihood of employment shocks, λ, leads to a rise in θ∗. By the other hand,
the maximum value of the ratio is clearly decreasing.
6 Conclusions
In this paper we have examined how the valuation of perpetual ESOs can be achieved by using a
stochastic discount factor derived from the constrained intertemporal optimization problem faced by
the executive. Following Ingersoll (2006), this constraint comes from the obligation to hold a proportion
of the company stock higher than the optimal one. We obtain a stochastic discount factor that, by
pricing the risk free asset, the market portfolio and the ﬁrm’s stock, can also price the option. In a
ﬁrst step, we obtain a closed form expression for the executive’s exercise policy. From this, a closed
formula for the subjective value of ESOs with and without a vesting period is obtained. Furthermore,
shareholders’ cost follows easily from the subjective threshold price that characterizes the executive’s
exercise policy.
Despite considering perpetual ESOs, our valuation method approximates reasonably well the
more realistic ﬁnite maturity case. This is true for both, the subjective and the objective ESO price.
Since the latter is the ESO cost for ﬁrms and this must be calculated as part of the ﬁrm ﬁnancial
statements, our approach can be useful for this purpose. Furthermore, in Section 4.3, we have checked
that our approach can also approximate reasonably well the expected term of the ESO, which is also
part of the information the ﬁrm must disclosure to their shareholders.
Finally, we have also examined the impact of ESOs on executives incentives, highlighting the
role of the employment shock likelihood. In particular, we have found that a higher job turnover rate
implies lower incentives for both raising the company market value and taking on projects with high
correlation with market expected return. In this latter case, there appears to be a critical value of θ for
23which the executive’s perceived incentive per unit cost of the ﬁrm achieves a maximum. This maximum
is decreasing with respect to the size of the idiosyncratic volatility.
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dt + βσMVSSdZM + σIVSSdZI.
This equation together with equation (5) will lead to our fundamental equation (7). Indeed, by omitting terms







































where E0 denotes the conditional expectation operator under the real measure and the CAPM condition,




, has been used to obtain the third equation. Now, by straightforward substitution, we get:




















































Finally, by deﬁning ˆ r = r − γθ
2σ
2






I we obtain equation (7).
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where ˆ α1 and ˆ α2 are, respectively, the positive and negative root of the quadratic equation ˆ α
2 +
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= 0. The constants ˆ a1 and ˆ b2 can be solved in terms of ˆ b1 and K by using the usual conditions of value
25matching and smooth pasting for S = K:
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And for ˆ a1:
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To determine the remaining constant, ˆ b1, and the threshold price, S
⋆, we use equations (8) and (9) to get:
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= ˆ S
∗ − K , (24)
ˆ α1 ˆ b1 ˆ S∗ ˆ α1 + ˆ α2 ˆ b2 ˆ S∗ ˆ α2 +
λˆ S
∗
λ + ˆ qS
= ˆ S
∗ . (25)
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1−ˆ α1 ≡ ˆ B1K
1−ˆ α1 . (26)
Hence, we can write ˆ a1 as:















ˆ α1 − ˆ α2
  ≡ ˆ A1K
1−ˆ α1 (27)
so that, equation (10) in the main text is obtained.
Finally, by combining equations (24) and (25) we get the implicit equation for solving for ˆ S
∗ which, by
using the relations given in equation (21), can be written as equation (11) in the main text.
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for c any given real number. Given the
























































where ε, εM and εI are independent standard normal variables satisfying σSε = βσMεM + σIεI. Then, the



































































denotes the density function of a standard normal variable. Notice that the range of integration
for εM and εI must be such that a ≤ Sν ≤ b.








Notice that δ1 and δ2 are too independent standard normal variables. By reversing the change we have the






















































































We turn next to the speciﬁcation of the integration region for each of the new variables. Clearly, for






























or more compactly A ≤ δ1 ≤ B. By the other hand the range of integration for δ2 is unrestricted. Hence, by

















































































































for µ = ln(S0) +
 




ν and σ = σS
√
ν. In the computation of this integral we have made use of
the relationship ˆ r − ˆ qS = r − qS − γθσ
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29Table 1: Subjective perpetual ESO valuation
β = 0 β = 1
θ 0.00 0.10 0.20 0.30 0.40 0.00 0.10 0.20 0.30 0.40
γ σS Panel A: λ = 0.1, ν = 0
2 0.30 11.000 8.802 7.404 6.420 5.683 11.000 9.673 8.714 7.987 7.416
0.40 12.859 9.617 7.813 6.624 5.768 12.859 10.266 8.694 7.611 6.810
0.60 16.248 10.866 8.410 6.923 5.911 16.248 11.273 8.899 7.432 6.419
4 0.30 11.000 7.273 5.415 4.281 3.516 11.000 8.605 7.127 6.105 5.348
0.40 12.859 7.644 5.456 4.215 3.416 12.859 8.527 6.453 5.190 4.332
0.60 16.248 8.174 5.538 4.185 3.345 16.248 8.656 6.007 4.596 3.719
Panel B: λ = 0.1, ν = 3
2 0.30 9.778 7.692 6.365 5.415 4.689 9.778 8.516 7.613 6.928 6.392
0.40 11.324 8.232 6.450 5.221 4.310 11.324 8.858 7.337 6.259 5.446
0.60 14.095 8.756 6.054 4.356 3.216 14.095 9.187 6.616 4.961 3.823
4 0.30 9.778 6.233 4.382 3.169 2.311 9.778 7.505 6.098 5.101 4.343
0.40 11.324 6.259 3.892 2.466 1.560 11.324 7.159 5.012 3.617 2.645
0.60 14.095 5.733 2.636 1.205 0.533 14.095 6.296 3.193 1.635 0.828
Panel C: λ = 0.2, ν = 0
2 0.30 8.296 6.930 5.994 5.306 4.774 8.296 7.485 6.863 6.370 5.969
0.40 9.951 7.863 6.597 5.720 5.066 9.951 8.297 7.216 6.434 5.837
0.60 13.080 9.380 7.507 6.311 5.468 13.080 9.677 7.884 6.718 5.885
4 0.30 8.296 5.920 4.612 3.766 3.170 8.296 6.803 5.807 5.086 4.536
0.40 9.951 6.492 4.856 3.865 3.197 9.951 7.116 5.610 4.639 3.952
0.60 13.080 7.340 5.179 3.990 3.238 13.080 7.716 5.573 4.360 3.574
Panel D: λ = 0.2, ν = 3
2 0.30 6.240 5.062 4.263 3.668 3.199 6.240 5.538 5.009 4.593 4.258
0.40 7.365 5.560 4.433 3.625 3.011 7.365 5.939 4.996 4.300 3.761
0.60 9.450 6.120 4.290 3.108 2.304 9.450 6.404 4.674 3.528 2.729
4 0.30 6.240 4.192 3.019 2.215 1.630 6.240 4.954 4.100 3.470 2.978
0.40 7.365 4.320 2.743 1.758 1.120 7.365 4.894 3.495 2.550 1.878
0.60 9.450 4.077 1.901 0.874 0.389 9.450 4.464 2.296 1.184 0.602
This table shows the subjective ESO value obtained by using either equation (10) or (13). The ﬁrst column, γ, contains
diﬀerent risk-aversion coeﬃcients. The second column, σS, contains the diﬀerent levels of ﬁrm’s stock volatility. The
next ﬁve columns are obtained with β = 0 and the remaining ones with β = 1. We also consider diﬀerent values of
θ ranging from 0% to 40%. The table is divided in four panels for diﬀerent combinations of the employment shock
intensity, λ, and the vesting period, ν. Other parameters for ESO valuation are: S0 = K = $30, corresponding to
the initial ﬁrm’s stock price and the option strike price respectively, the yearly risk-free rate, r = 6%, the yearly stock
continuously compounded dividend rate, qS = 1.5% and the yearly market portfolio volatility, σM = 20%.
30Table 2: Objective ESO valuation: perpetual vs. ﬁnite maturity (10 years)
Perpetual ESO price Finite maturity ESO price
θ θ
λ β γ 0.00 0.10 0.20 0.30 0.40 0.00 0.10 0.20 0.30 0.40
Panel A: ν = 1
0.1 0 2 12.534 11.907 11.007 10.217 9.572 11.424 10.932 10.377 9.892 9.479
4 12.534 10.893 9.310 8.280 7.595 11.424 10.328 9.332 8.568 7.960
1 2 12.534 12.136 11.500 10.892 10.361 11.424 11.082 10.680 10.293 9.960
4 12.534 11.404 10.084 9.099 8.383 11.424 10.620 9.825 9.175 8.627
0.2 0 2 9.339 9.002 8.481 8.011 7.622 8.429 8.609 8.249 7.938 7.659
4 9.339 8.420 7.479 6.840 6.398 8.429 8.207 7.573 7.070 6.672
1 2 9.339 9.130 8.766 8.407 8.087 8.429 8.702 8.446 8.190 7.977
4 9.339 8.716 7.940 7.345 6.900 8.429 8.407 7.899 7.475 7.116
Panel B: ν = 3
0.1 0 2 11.324 10.795 10.175 9.701 9.342 10.217 9.919 9.664 9.452 9.253
4 11.324 10.103 9.201 8.665 8.318 10.217 9.645 9.197 8.794 8.460
1 2 11.324 10.975 10.500 10.102 9.784 10.217 9.981 9.780 9.623 9.478
4 11.324 10.435 9.625 9.089 8.718 10.217 9.778 9.432 9.110 8.821
0.2 0 2 7.365 7.120 6.830 6.606 6.433 6.986 6.821 6.690 6.572 6.454
4 7.365 6.800 6.372 6.108 5.929 6.986 6.681 6.421 6.199 6.010
1 2 7.365 7.204 6.981 6.793 6.640 6.986 6.854 6.757 6.664 6.584
4 7.365 6.953 6.573 6.316 6.132 6.986 6.745 6.557 6.379 6.219
Panel C: ν = 5
0.1 0 2 9.905 9.520 9.120 8.827 8.610 8.826 8.708 8.587 8.470 8.368
4 9.905 9.075 8.526 8.205 7.998 8.826 8.577 8.341 8.118 7.933
1 2 9.905 9.644 9.326 9.074 8.878 8.826 8.737 8.654 8.565 8.482
4 9.905 9.284 8.781 8.459 8.237 8.826 8.642 8.463 8.290 8.129
0.2 0 2 5.465 5.319 5.168 5.056 4.972 5.125 5.070 5.011 4.954 4.901
4 5.465 5.152 4.942 4.814 4.728 5.125 5.006 4.889 4.785 4.698
1 2 5.465 5.366 5.245 5.149 5.073 5.125 5.081 5.042 4.999 4.959
4 5.465 5.231 5.040 4.915 4.826 5.125 5.036 4.949 4.868 4.790
This table shows the objective value for the perpetual ESO (left side) and for a ﬁnite maturity ESO of ten years (right
side) denoted as V SUB and V SUB
T , respectively. The ﬁrst column, λ, contains diﬀerent values of the employment
shock intensity. The second column, β, contains diﬀerent levels of the market beta. The third column, γ, represents
diﬀerent levels of executive’s risk aversion. V SUB and V SUB
T are obtained under ﬁve diﬀerent values of θ ranging
from 0% to 40%. We also consider three diﬀerent vesting period lengths in Panel A (ν = 1 years), Panel B (ν = 3
years) and Panel C (ν = 5 years). The perpetual values have been obtained using Corollary 6. For the ﬁnite
maturity cases, the procedure to obtain these prices are described in subsection 3.2. The values for the remaining
parameters are: S0 = K = $30, r = 6%, qS = 1.5%, σS = 40% and σM = 20%.
31Figure 1: Subjective ESO price and diversiﬁcation level



































θ = 0 %
θ = 40 %
The ﬁgure plots the subjective ESO price, V SUB, as a function of the stock price for diﬀerent values of the portfolio
undiversiﬁcation parameter, θ. Note that the continuous line for θ = 0 represents the market ESO price, which acts
as an upper bound for V SUB. The values of the remaining parameters are: r = 6%, qS = 1.5%, γ = 4, λ = 20%,
σM = 20%, σS = 40%, K = $30 and ν = 0.
32Figure 2: Subjective ESO price and time to maturity







































































































θ = 0.1 θ = 0.2 θ = 0.3 θ = 0.4
β = 1, λ = 0.1
β = 1, λ = 0.2
β = 0, λ = 0.1
β = 0, λ = 0.2
This ﬁgure shows the subjective ESO value (left-hand graphics) for diﬀerent ﬁnite maturities (in x-axis) ranging
from T = 5 to T = 25 years, denoted as V SUB
T . Each graphic exhibits a diﬀerent pair of values for (β,λ) and each
line, inside each graphic, corresponds to a diﬀerent value of θ. Any right-hand graphic displays the relative bias
of the perpetual ESO computed as (V SUB − V SUB
T )/V SUB
T , where V SUB is the perpetual ESO price from Table
1. The procedure to obtain V SUB
T is described in Subsection 3.2. The values for the remaining parameters are:
S0 = K = $30, r = 6%, qS = 1.5%, λ = 20%, σS = 40%, σM = 20% and ν = 3 years.
33Figure 3: Firm cost of perpetual ESO
































γ = 2; β = 1
γ = 2; β = 0
γ = 2; β = 1
γ = 2; β = 0
γ = 4; β = 1
γ = 4; β = 0
γ = 4; β = 0
γ = 4; β = 1
The left hand graphic represents the ﬁrm cost, V OBJ, of a perpetual ESO for several values of γ and β. In this
ﬁgure, the continuous line represents the risk neutral value, V RN, of the perpetual ESO. The right hand graphic
displays the ratio between the subjective and the objective values. The values of the other parameters are: r = 6%,
qS = 1.5%, σS = 30%, σM = 20%, λ = 20%, S0 = K = $30 and ν = 3.
Figure 4: Expected term and FAS 123R






























































































This ﬁgure compares the expected term from a ﬁnite maturity ESO of 10 years and a vesting period of 3 years
(discontinuous line) with that obtained by calibrating equation (19) using a price equal to the perpetual ESO value
(solid line). The remaining values of the parameters are: r = 6%, qS = 1.5%, σS = 40% and S0 = K = $30.












Picture I : σ












Picture II : σ












Picture III : σ












Picture IV : σ
S = 60%; θ = 40%
This ﬁgure shows the distribution for objective ESO values implied by the corresponding random samples drawn
from alternative Triangular distributions of λ, denoted as A, B and C which have been described in subsection 4.4.
The values for the remaining parameters are: r = 6%, qS = 1.5%, γ = 4, β = 1, σS = 40%, β = 1, S0 = $30 and
K = $30.
35Figure 6: Greek ratios and employment shock











Picture II:  S
0 = K = $30; σ
I = 30%























Picture I:  S
0 = K = $30, σ
I = 30%














λ = 5% λ = 10% λ = 20%
Picture I displays the delta ratio, ∆SUB/∆OBJ, as a function of θ taking S0 = K as a midpoint in the computation
of the numerical partial derivatives. Picture II displays the systematic risk ratio, ΛSUB
β /ΛOBJ
β , as a function of θ
using β = 1 as a midpoint. Each picture depicts several plots for diﬀerent values of the likelihood of employment
shocks, λ. The values for the remaining parameters are: r = 6%, qS = 1.5%, γ = 2, β = 1, σM = 20% and ν = 3.
Figure 7: Greek ratios and idiosyncratic risk










0 = K = $30, β = 1, σ














Excess of stock holding (θ)
 
 










0 = K = $30, β = 1, σ














Excess of stock holding (θ)
σ
I = 20% σ
i = 30% σ
I = 40%
Pictures I and II display the systematic vega ratio, ΛSUB
β /ΛOBJ
β , as a function of θ for λ = 5% and λ = 10%,
respectively. In both cases, the ratio is computed for at-the-money ESOs and γ = 2. Each picture depicts several
plots for diﬀerent idiosyncratic risk values, σI. The values for the remaining parameters are: r = 6%, qS = 1.5%,
β = 1, σM = 20% and ν = 3.
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